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A DEFENSE OF PUBLIC JUSTIFICATION 
 
Simon Pickus 
Abstract    Public justification is a concept presented by John 
Rawls as a way to legitimize political authority and to make 
fundamental political arguments.  In essence, the principle holds 
that one should only present arguments that the opposition can 
reasonably accept, as opposed to appealing to a religious or 
political conception of the good.  This paper seeks to present a 
cogent conception of the principle of public justification. The 
strengths of the principle will be explained, and the main critiques 
of the position will be examined and defended against.  By this 
method, Rawls‘ conception of public justification can be shown to 
be a compelling and robust position. 
 
 Among the more pressing issues that have persisted 
throughout Western political and philosophical thought have been 
how political power can be rightly exercised, and how can political 
disputes between passionate parties be fairly resolved. Under what 
circumstances can the coercive power of the state be implemented 
in a way that is just and right?  Bloodlines, military might, and 
religious mandates have all been appealed to as justification for 
political authority, but these are all answers monarchs and 
emperors have given to their already cowed populaces.  
Compelling answers to these questions presented by thinkers such 
as Hobbes, Locke, and Rousseau emerged in the form of 
reasonable consent of the governed as a legitimizing factor for 
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political authorities.  In the 20
th
 century, the widely-read political 
philosopher John Rawls best articulated the concept of public 
justification, a principle in which political authority can be 
considered legitimate only insofar as the reasons given for political 
action could be reasonably accepted by those who are governed.  
For this project, I will begin by giving a general overview of the 
position as conceived and presented by Rawls in his more recent 
works.  I will follow this outline of public justification by 
explaining why this view is appealing and what problems within 
political thought it solves, or at least purports to solve.  I will then 
present brief explanations of some of the more pressing objections 
to the theory, and will conclude with a refutation of these critiques.   
The Idea of Public Justification 
 For Rawls, the principle of public justification is one that 
exists within what Rawls refers to as a well-ordered society.  This 
means that, for him, any discussion of public justification 
presupposes a democratic society with a political culture that is 
pluralistic and has a commonly accepted conception of justice. In 
addition, Rawls notes that, ―Accepting this conception does not 
presuppose accepting any particular comprehensive doctrine.‖1  To 
clarify, ―comprehensive doctrine‖ is a Rawlsian term for a 
complete conception of the moral good and a thorough set of 
values.  Although these are not by necessity comprehensive, what 
is important about them is that they comprise a set of values and a 
conception of the moral good. Some examples of comprehensive 
doctrines are religious beliefs and moral philosophical codes such 
                                                 
1
 John Rawls, Justice as Fairness: A Restatement (Cambridge: Harvard 
University Press, 2001), 26. 
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as utilitarianism.  Here Rawls is emphasizing that the principle of 
public justification is distinct from any one conception of the good 
or set of moral values. It does not presuppose a religion or ethical 
code, and does not need to.  As it is meant to function within a 
society that has a plurality of comprehensive doctrines that its 
citizens accept, public justification is compatible with all 
reasonable conceptions of the good.   
It is important here to note the particular meaning of 
―reasonable‖ in this context, as it is a conceptually significant term.  
For Rawls, ―…reasonable persons are ready to propose, or to 
acknowledge when proposed by others, the principles needed to 
specify what can be seen by all as fair terms of cooperation.‖2  By 
this Rawls means that to be reasonable is to act fairly and to seek 
cooperation and the resolution of disputes.  A reasonable person 
will not enter into an agreement knowing that they will later 
violate that agreement, not will they staunchly refuse any attempt 
at resolving a disagreement.  Additionally, reasonable people will 
seek to end conflicts and live peaceably, even if doing so is not 
always in complete accord with their rational self-interests.  Acting 
reasonably is, as Rawls sees it, distinct from acting rationally, 
although in no way does reasonableness preclude rationality.  It is 
very possible, however, to act rationally and unreasonably at the 
same time.  An example of this would be a person who enters a 
long-term agreement and immediately forsakes that agreement 
when they see a way to derive some advantage from it.  Another 
way to conceptualize this distinction is in the context of rational 
self-interest.  To act in accord with rational self-interest is always 
                                                 
2
 Rawls, Justice as Fairness, 7. 
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rational but not always reasonable.  The example of the tragedy of 
commons demonstrates that rational self interest leads to what 
Rawls would call unreasonable behavior, because it does not 
indicate a desire for fair cooperation.  Rawls‘ conception of the 
reasonable, I find, agrees in large part with commonly held 
intuitions of what it is to act reasonably.   
 The principle of public justification, once established in the 
Rawlsian political context, is the vehicle for those with political 
disagreements to discuss and resolve their disputes in ways that are 
reasonable and acceptable to all involved.  As Rawls explains, this 
principle allows people and groups to ―…justify to one another 
their political judgments: each cooperates, politically and socially, 
with the rest on terms all can endorse as just.  This is the meaning 
of public justification.‖3  Here Rawls explains the very basic idea 
of the public justification principle.   
People within a well-ordered society, or any developed 
democratic society as we would recognize today, will inevitably 
disagree with each other and their leaders on their political and 
social policy judgments.  This alone is difficult to dispute.  There 
are many reasons, even within a well-ordered society with a shared 
conception of justice, for these disagreements, such as what Rawls 
refers to as the plurality of comprehensive doctrines.  He claims 
that, ―…a diversity of conflicting and irreconcilable yet reasonable 
comprehensive doctrines will come about and persist…This fact 
about free societies is what I call the fact of reasonable pluralism.‖4 
Once the aforementioned disputes arise, public justification acts as 
                                                 
3
 Ibid, 27. 
4
 Ibid, 34. 
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a mechanism for their resolution.  People and groups justify their 
political judgments by presenting arguments that their opponents 
can reasonably endorse as a means of making their views plausible 
within the worldviews of the other.  Using public justification, they 
appeal not to their conception of the good, such as, for example, 
the principle of utility or the intrinsic value and dignity of a human 
being, but rather they appeal to political values and reasons they 
both share so as to cooperatively come to a conclusion.  In this way 
political disputes can, ideally, be solved in such that all can 
reasonably accept the conclusion without having to violate their 
closely held values and beliefs.  Rawls goes on to note that, 
―Public justification proceeds from some consensus: from premises 
all parties in disagreement, assumed to be free and equal and fully 
capable of reason, may reasonably be expected to endorse.‖5   
The general aim of this principle, then, is to provide a way 
for political judgments to be justified without appeal to reasons 
that the disagreeing party would never accept.  A utilitarian could 
never convince a Kantian that a political moral dilemma can be 
solved using the principle of utility, no more than an Orthodox Jew 
could appeal to his or her religious tenets to convince a political 
opponent who is an adherent of Islam.  No matter how dearly 
someone holds their conception of the moral good, they will not be 
able to offer compelling arguments to me if I do not agree with that 
idea of the good.  They would need to find a set of criteria we both 
accept. By avoiding argument entrenched in the values of a 
comprehensive doctrine, public justification aims to avoid some of 
the persistent and pressing disagreements that have plagued 
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political discourse.  Additionally, it reinforces political cooperation 
and reasonable discourse in a way that is consistent with a 
functioning democracy. 
  One important distinction that Rawls emphasizes is that 
public justification does not have a basis in simple agreement.  
What sets public justification aside as unique is its appeal to a 
common ground of reasonable arguments based, in part, on a 
shared conception of justice that allows for important political 
disputes to be fairly solved.  Rawls himself states that, ―It is this 
last condition of reasoned reflection that, among other things, 
distinguishes public justification from mere agreement.‖6  Here 
Rawls shows the true importance of justifying political positions 
by presenting reasons anyone could reasonably accept.  It is this 
aspect of public justification that sets it apart and, as I will now 
explain, it is this aspect that makes the principle of public 
justification appealing. 
 
Why Public Justification is Compelling 
 The theory of public justification has a variety of strengths 
that make it a very compelling way to approach political discourse 
and legitimacy.  The first largely intuitive main strength of public 
justification is that it serves as an alternative to tyranny and 
oppression, and as construed here does not allow for tyranny or 
oppression of any sort.  The very nature of public justification does 
not allow for any sort totalitarian coercive rule that is imposed on 
the populace of a nation unwillingly.  This aspect of public 
justification, though simple and straightforward, is a significant 
                                                 
6
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point in its favor. 
 A second way in which the principle of public justification 
is strongly compelling is that it provides a way to solve political 
disputes that otherwise seem too divisive or too deeply entrenched 
in moral values for either party to possibly accept the other‘s 
position.  This is particularly relevant to American politics, and 
similar systems, in which there is a political culture of such 
profoundly divided adversarial fervor that a resolution between the 
adversaries, in this case the two political parties, seems completely 
unfeasible.  Joshua Cohen, a prominent contemporary political 
philosopher, echoes this sentiment when he notes, ―The more 
immediate concerns come from the pathologically polarized state 
of political discourse in the United States.‖7  He goes on to state 
that the intention of politics is to confront and overcome important 
and pressing issues relating to people and what they value in their 
lives, which is significant because ―…public reason arguably 
provides a more promising basis than polarized disagreement for 
doing the works of politics, and…decent and inclusive political life 
is not only a profoundly important good, but a painfully fragile 
one.‖8  In essence, the principle of public justification allows us to 
do the important work of politics without being hobbled by the 
vehement political culture that currently exists in the U.S.  All that 
is required for this to work is that those engaged in political 
arguments accept that giving conceptions of the good as criteria for 
political decisions is not only unreasonable but disrespectful, as it 
is essentially a demand that political opponents defer to one‘s 
                                                 
7
 Joshua Cohen, ―Politics, Power, and Public Reason‖ (paper presented at the 
UCLA Legal Theory Workshop, Los Angeles, California, April 17, 2008): 2. 
8
 Cohen, ―Politics, Power, and Public Reason.‖ 3 
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comprehensive doctrine.  Were politicians and pundits to accept 
this burden of respect and consider the practical advantages of 
public justification, we would not be stuck in such a partisan rut.  
In this case, public justification is compelling in that it avoids this 
issue by leading the disputing parties to converse using reasons 
that the other side might reasonably accept.  At the very least, this 
principle presents the possibility of progress beyond the partisan 
impasse that some see the United States to be stuck in, and in this 
way public justification is compelling to American political 
thinkers. 
  A third reason that public justification is appealing lies in 
the distinction between rational and reasonable.  As a method for 
justifying political positions and authority, public justification as 
presented by Rawls prioritizes the reasonable over the rational.  To 
some, the appeal to discussion between reasonable people without 
emphasizing acting in strictly rational ways lies in the avoidance of 
prisoner‘s dilemma-type situations.  By this I mean that for some, 
political discourse is problematic because it can be said to be 
populated by those who act strictly in their own interests and the 
interests of their associates; people who act in ruthlessly 
calculating ways.  Public justification, on the other hand, ensures 
political discourse in which nobody is trying to trick their 
opponents, but rather encourages reasonable people to make 
genuinely persuasive arguments so as arrive at resolutions of 
political disputes.  This emphasis on reasonableness is appealing to 
some because it presents a less adversarial, more cooperative 
method of dealing with political disagreements.  As an 
environment focused on the genuine resolution of the issues in 
reasonable and productive ways, public justification is an 
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appealing principle.  
 A fourth strength of public justification is the way in which 
it provides a means for the maintenance of both legitimacy and 
stability in contractarian societies, those societies with a basis in 
some sort of founding agreement or governing document.  A very 
real issue for these societies is that in several generations that 
society will be comprised of citizens who were not party to the 
original contractarian agreement.  In a Hobbesian society, for 
example, once this point is reached, and there is no effective 
institutional way to change the society, then it is only a matter of 
time until circumstances change such that sufficient people reject 
the original contractarian agreement and the foundations of the 
society collapse.  For this reason, there will come a point at which 
the members of the society no longer see a compelling reason to 
continue to submit to the coercive powers of the state granted by 
their ancestors.  Public justification becomes appealing in this 
circumstance because it provides a plausible means for the 
contractarian society to change according to the wills of its citizens 
without a fundamental threat to its stability.  Since the society‘s 
basic institutions are now mutable according to the will of the 
current populace, general discontent with the contractarian nature 
of the state is no longer an issue.  In this way public justification is 
a compelling principle to those who adhere to contractarian 
conceptions of statehood. 
 
Objection 1: Begs the Question 
 In addition to its many compelling features, the principle of 
public justification has significant objections to contend with.  To 
begin, it is necessary to clarify the concept of public reason and its 
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interaction with public justification.  As Rawls puts it, public 
reasons are, ―…the political values covered by the political 
conception of justice (or one of a suitable family of such).‖9  In 
essence, public reasons are those we can give to justify our actions 
and positions to others within our society who therefore share our 
basic political conceptions.  As Cohen puts it, ―…the ideal of 
public reason says that in our political affairs…justification ought 
to be conducted on common ground…common ground provided 
by considerations that participants in the political relations can all 
acknowledge as reasons.‖10  Simply put, public reason is the 
vehicle of public justification; reasons that are publicly justifiable 
are discussed using public reason.  It is the form of reason we use 
to justify our political judgments to others.  In this sense a 
discussion of public reason goes hand-in-hand with one of public 
justification, and a rejection of public reason is a rejection of 
public justification.    
The first objection I will address comes from a writer 
named Bruce Brower of Tulane University.  In his article The 
Limits of Public Reason, Brower analyzes several ways in which 
Rawls can make public reason, and by extension public 
justification, compelling to those who do not accept the priority of 
the reasonable.  If I can refute any one of these, it would show that 
Rawls‘ project does not succumb to the limitations Brower 
presents.  I am choosing to address one of these lines of argument, 
in which Brower claims that the demands of public reason violate 
equal respect and can be shown to be compelling only to those that 
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already accept the ideal of the reasonable.  In other words, Brower 
argues that the case for public reason begs the question. Brower 
argues that the demands of public justification violate equal respect 
because they require people to abandon values and beliefs that are 
deeply important to them.  As he writes, ―Treating others equally 
and acting autonomously…requires us to ignore an important part 
of our character…‖11 Here Brower is arguing that in requiring that 
people not use their conception of the good to make fundamental 
political decisions Rawls is asking them to forsake something too 
important to simply discard.  Brower goes on to argue that 
proponents of public justification, ―…do ignore something 
‗constitutive‘ of our persons: that we care deeply about our 
conceptions of the good and associated justifications…The 
problem is…Rawlsian arguments will be acceptable only to those 
who have already approved the…ideal of the reasonable person.‖12 
This is the meat of the objection that Brower presents.  Rawls fails 
to show equal respect because he devalues peoples‘ constitutive 
values on the grounds that they are not publicly acceptable reasons 
to give in a political sense.  Because of this, Brower feels that 
Rawls is saying that people should not give morally-grounded 
justifications, and should rather give public justifications, which 
are more reasonable.  But, Brower claims, this requires that 
someone has already accepted the priority of the reasonable.  
Because of this, public justification is only compelling to those 
who already accept it.   
This objection is not as strong as it first appears, and it in 
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 Bruce W. Brower, ―The Limits of Public Reason,‖ The Journal of Philosophy 
91 (1994): 14. 
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 Brower, ―The Limits of Public Reason,‖ 15. 
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fact undermines itself.  There are two primary claims to deal with: 
the demands of public justification violate equal respect, and 
public justification is not compelling to those who have not already 
accepted it.  A fair way to analyze this objection is to consider a 
political dialogue between two people and look to see if the issues 
Brower presented indeed occur.  Abe is someone who wants to 
make political arguments based on his conception of the moral 
good.  Zeke is a proponent of public justification.  He adheres to a 
comprehensive doctrine but does not seek to ground political 
arguments in the values of that doctrine.  Abe claims that society 
should implement policy A because it is consistent with his 
comprehensive doctrine‘s view of the moral good.  Zeke says that 
that conception of the good conflicts with his own, and as such he 
cannot reasonably accept Abe‘s justification.  Zeke suggests that 
Abe appeal to shared aspects of their society‘s political culture.  
Abe responds by saying that it is disrespectful that he be asked to 
discard his comprehensive doctrine, which is very important to 
him, when making this important political argument.  This is the 
point Brower gets at.  My response is to ask what, then, is the 
alternative?  It seems as though the only way out of this impasse 
for Abe is that Zeke accept his conception of the good and 
therefore his political argument.  But this undermines any attempt 
at equal respect that Brower wants to make.  If this is what 
comprises equal respect, then Abe‘s demand of Zeke is no less 
disrespectful than Zeke‘s demand.  For people who value 
conceptions of the good and their importance as much as Brower 
does, it follows that they would then find it unfair to ask someone 
else to defer to their conception of the good, as that would be 
demanding that they disregard a personally constitutive value. 
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I respond that Brower‘s standard for equal respect is too 
high to be feasible, and that it will inevitably lead to the impasse 
mentioned above.  Given the aforementioned fact of reasonable 
pluralism, which I take to be uncontroversial in a free society, this 
impasse will occur constantly.  Public justification is compelling 
precisely because it is a mechanism for this plurality of doctrines 
to exist without anyone having to defer to another‘s conception of 
the moral good.  A more proper standard for equal respect is to 
consider each comprehensive doctrine to be as valuable as any 
other.  This standard of respect, together with the fact of reasonable 
pluralism, leads us to conclude that those who hold conceptions of 
the good to be vitally important to people would in fact find a 
reason to endorse public justification.  It provides a mechanism for 
political cooperation while maintaining everyone‘s deeply 
important values and ensuring that the standard of equal respect is 
not violated.  This conclusion in addition to the strengths of public 
justification I mentioned earlier provides a very strong basis for the 
acceptance of public justification by those who do not necessarily 
endorse Rawls‘ ideal of the reasonable. 
 
Objection 2: Self-Defeating 
   The second objection to the theory of public justification I 
will address is presented by Steven Wall in his article, Is Public 
Justification Self-Defeating?. Wall argues that public justification 
is in need of justification, and is unable to satisfactorily meet its 
own demands to justify itself to those who it would apply to.  In 
other words, Wall is arguing that public justification is not in itself 
sufficiently publicly justifiable to justify itself as a principle for 
determining the legitimacy of political authority.  Wall begins his 
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argument by defining public justification in a way that is coherent 
and continuous with the way it has been defined here.  He claims 
that among the relevant requirements for political authority to be 
publicly justifiable is what he calls the ―acceptability requirement.‖ 
Wall defines this by saying, ―…the justification must be one that 
can be reasonably accepted (or not reasonably rejected) by those to 
whom it is addressed.‖13 There is nothing problematic here. He 
goes on to discuss how we must make a distinction between a 
public justification and a correctness-based justification.  For Wall, 
a correctness-based justification is one that demonstrates that a 
conclusion is correct, whereas public justification, something that 
has already been made clear, is distinct from this.  This is 
significant for Wall because if proponents of public justification do 
not hold that political authority must be legitimized by both of the 
aforementioned justifications, then they are left to answer why 
public justification is even worth discussing.  Wall continues by 
explaining that this can be resolved by claiming that public 
justification serves to mark the outer limits of our freedom
14
, and 
as such leads to what Wall calls the ―reconciling function‖ of 
public justification, which serves to show that each person has a 
good reason, by appealing to public justification, to accept political 
authority. This function demonstrates why a correctness-based 
justification is not inherently sufficient for legitimizing political 
authority. 
 Wall argues that despite the appeal of the reconciling 
feature of public justification, it is still not an inherently correct 
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 Steven Wall, ―Is Public Justification Self-Defeating?‖ American Philosophical 
Quarterly 39 (2002): 385. 
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theory of political legitimacy.  This, Wall explains, ―…is why it is 
reasonable to say that [public justification] stands in need of 
justification.‖15  In other words, since public justification does not 
claim to be correct on moral grounds, it needs to be justified by 
other means.  So, Wall asks, what sort of justification is required?  
The answer is that public justification must satisfy its own 
requirements, and for this reason the theory might be self-
defeating.  As Wall puts it, ―If [public justification] were indeed a 
self-defeating principle, then it would fail on its own terms.  This 
would give us a reason to reject it.‖16  Wall proceeds by claiming 
that supporters of public justification must now either demonstrate 
that public justification does not apply to itself, or that it does in 
fact meet its own demands.  Wall addresses the first claim and 
argues that it is untenable because it contradicts the very purpose 
of public justification.  To claim that public justification does not 
need to meet its own demands would be to say that any given 
authority is publicly justifiable but then not offer a reason to accept 
the constraints of public justifiability.  This does not get us 
anywhere.   
Wall addresses the second claim against the self-defeat of 
public justification in two ways.  In the first, Wall argues that any 
attempt to argue that public justification applies to itself because of 
values that permeate contemporary democratic societies would 
have to contend with the objection that the principle of equal 
respect is in fact not embedded in modern democratic societies.  
This results in there being at least some people in contemporary 
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society who would not reasonably accept the theory of public 
justification.  Secondly, Wall discusses how even if there did exist 
some sort of background political value that all members of a 
society shared, people would disagree as to the particular nature of 
that value.  In this case there would be so much disagreement 
about the shared value that the value would be too thin a concept to 
appeal to when giving public reasons.   
 Wall concludes his discussion of public justification by 
expressing doubt that there is any recourse for those who support 
public justification to prove that it in fact is not self-defeating.  
Additionally, he notes, political legitimacy might be a matter of 
degree, and that public justification still serves to legitimize 
political authority better than any alternatives.  He concludes by 
claiming that given that even if these might be valid options for the 
proponent of public justification, they do not refute the overall 
claim that public justification is self-defeating.  
 To begin my response to this objection, I note that Wall 
seems to give a charitable presentation of the general principle of 
public justification.  I will also concede here that since public 
justification is not a correctness-based justification, it does need to 
be justified further.  I will here accept the claim that in order to 
avoid being self-defeating, public justification must either be said 
to not apply to itself, or must itself be publicly justifiable.  I will 
refute this objection by showing that public justification is itself 
publicly justifiable.  This is because, despite Wall‘s insistence to 
the contrary, there is indeed a commonly held political conception 
of justice in contemporary democratic societies, and it is that 
conception of justice that can be appealed to in order to justify the 
theory of public justification, as well as other political claims.  
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Although there are considerable disagreements when it comes to 
moral conceptions of justice, such as how to punish criminals and 
what moral codes people ought to abide by, when it comes to 
political discourse Americans still share fundamental intuition 
about what political justice is.  By this I mean our political culture 
holds that taxation without representation, for example, is unfair 
and unjust in a political sense.  Americans expect the will of the 
people and the spirit of the constitution to be enforced as matters of 
justice and would as a group reject a leader or proposal that 
violates the basic tenets of democracy and representation.  We have 
an understanding of society as what Rawls calls ―…a fair system 
of social cooperation over time from one generation to the next.‖17  
We have a sense of basic liberties as defined by our constitution.  
This commonly-held conception of justice, broadly defined, 
functions as a baseline that publicly justifiable arguments can 
appeal to.  In other words, this shared conception of political 
justice in American political culture is a common ground that 
demonstrates that the principle of public justification can be 
applied to the United States.  I am confident that such shared 
conceptions of justice exist in similarly democratic nations.   
Here it is important again to note the distinction between 
agreement and a shared political conception of justice.  People 
agree when for whatever reason they both find an argument or idea 
appealing.  A common conception of political justice, however, 
goes beyond agreement because it is a fundamental aspect of the 
democratic political culture that members of a free society share.  
They share it not because it is in accord with their conceptions of 
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the moral good, but because it is part of the political culture they 
belong to.  People who disagree on political and moral matters may 
still appeal to this shared political value and offer compelling 
arguments (i.e. public reasons) to each other.  It is from these 
public reasons that people may come to an agreement about 
political decisions or policies.  Because of this common ground I, 
or anyone else, can offer arguments in political disputes that are 
reasonable for my opponent to accept on the basis of political 
justice.   
Wall also argues that even were a shared political value to 
exist within a society, ―…it does not follow that everyone has 
reason to accept the particular interpretation of this principle that is 
needed to ground [public justification].‖18  I contend that even 
given differing interpretations of this value, the fundamental core 
of the value, such as justice, would suffice for the purposes of 
public justification.  Additionally, Rawls himself addresses this 
concern in his presentation of the idea of an overlapping 
consensus, wherein he echoes my claim.  As he writes, 
―While…all citizens affirm the same political conception of 
justice, we do not assume they do so for all the same reasons…but 
this does not prevent the political conception from being a shared 
point of view from which they can resolve questions concerning 
the constitutional essentials.‖19 As a result, public justification is in 
fact not self defeating because it can meet its own demands, and it 
can be shown that modern democratic societies do have sufficient 
shared political values for public reasons to be feasibly presented. 
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Conclusion 
 The principle of public justification, that political authority 
is legitimized and political disputes resolved by both parties 
appealing to arguments that the other side can reasonably accept, is 
to me a powerful principle.  Because it is not limited by 
conceptions of the moral good and because it can help us to escape 
the partisan rut we as Americans seem to be stuck in, public 
justification can act as a means to end long standing and seemingly 
irresolvable political disputes.  In addition, the emphasis of the 
reasonable over the rational ensures we avoid the pitfalls of 
unrelenting rational self-interest, such as those presented in the 
prisoner‘s dilemma and the tragedy of the commons.  Although 
objections are leveled against the theory, they are not sufficiently 
strong to dissuade us from accepting public justification and its 
advantages in terms of fairness, respect, and pragmatism.  In the 
end, public justification remains the most reasonable and 
compelling method for adequately resolving political disputes and 
legitimizing political authority.  I genuinely believe that this 
principle is the best way to overcome the obstacles of political 
oppression and divisiveness, in spite of people‘s desires to adhere 
only to their conceptions of the good.  Were just Americans to 
accept this principle, the contemporary political climate would 
improve tenfold, and much more genuine progress could be made. 
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